Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions

Kai A. Konrad
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Abstract

If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a consequence, equilibrium profits of both firms may increase, but the prize may be allocated less efficiently. The reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase the profits of the firms involved in the ownership relationship but without these negative efficiency effects.

Keywords: all-pay auctions, externalities, contests, silent minority shareholdings, ownership structure.

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1 Introduction

It is common for a firm to own minority shares in another competing firm, and these shareholdings are often small and not sufficient to give the firm that owns them formal control rights.\footnote{See, e.g., Gilo (2000) for some empirical evidence.} As discussed, for instance, in Reynolds and Snapp (1986), shareholdings of firm $A$ in firm $B$ may soften competition and increase industry profits, but most of these benefits go to outsiders or to firm $B$. In Cournot markets, firms therefore have little or no incentive to acquire shares in a market competitor (Reitman, 1994). Investing unilaterally in silent shareholdings can be profitable, depending on the shape of cost functions and the type of competition, as has been shown by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Flath (1991) and Reitman (1994), but when the owners of a firm $A$ acquire a partial interest without control rights in a firm $B$, there is a general tendency for this to benefit the owners of firm $B$ and other firms more than the owners of firm $A$. Minority shareholdings, or even cross-ownership holdings, are also mixed blessings with respect to the sustainability of tacit collusion (Malueg, 1992).\footnote{Minority shareholdings and the incentives an individual firm has to acquire such holdings must be distinguished from the problem of forming a coalition in terms of mutual cross-holdings or joint ventures, where both sides share in the benefits of reduced competition in a symmetric fashion. Mutual cross-holdings are much more likely to be profitable for all participants for a broad range of market games (see, e.g., Kwoka, 1992).}

Even though competition in auctions is an important part of modern business interaction, the role of minority shareholdings is less well understood in such auction markets. Ettinger (2002, 2003) and Dasgupta and Tsui (2004) are among the few contributions. However, they consider auctions, not all-
pay auctions\textsuperscript{3} and do not address the issue of whether acquiring shares in another firm is individually rational and profitable in such a context.\textsuperscript{4} Chillemi (2004) considers auctions and all-pay auctions with incomplete information with cross-holdings that fulfill a specific symmetry requirement. Structurally related problems emerge in auctions with externalities more generally.\textsuperscript{5}

All-pay auctions are the mode of competition between firms when they compete for market shares by advertizing and other marketing activities (see, e.g., Schmalensee, 1976), when firms compete for large projects and spend resources, for instance, in beauty contests, like in architecture, in the competition for spectrum rights in telecommunications in some countries (see, e.g., Börgers and Dustmann, 2003, p. 223 for a country survey) or in markets with strong network externalities in which firms compete for a de facto natural monopoly. This type of competition has been discussed in more detail, e.g., in Huck, Konrad and Müller (2001) and Konrad (2000).

Here competition between firms will be analysed if the mode of competition is an all-pay auction with complete information and if one firm has a silent minority interest in one of the other firms. It turns out that the acquisition of minority shareholdings in a competitor can be in the interest of both the owners of the buying firm and the majority owners of the firm in which minority shareholdings are acquired. The firm with the highest valuation of

\textsuperscript{3}An all-pay auction with different externalities is considered in Engers and McManus (2002).

\textsuperscript{4}R&D processes often take a special form of a contest. For an analysis of the role of complementarity of research inputs in non-cooperative joint ventures and a literature survey see Anbarci, Lenke and Roy (2002).

\textsuperscript{5}A key contribution to auction theory with externalities is Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996).
winning the auction prize may find it profitable to purchase a minority share in the firm with the second highest valuation of winning, and, given these shareholdings, may then abstain from bidding in the equilibrium. The results in this paper provide a partial solution to the more general problem of an all-pay auction with externalities in a framework with complete information.6

In section 2 the general structure of the problem that is analysed here is described in more detail. The benchmark equilibrium without shareholdings as in Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996) is discussed in section 3. Minority shareholdings and their profitability and welfare properties are analysed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.

2 The problem structure

Consider a set $N$ of firms $i = 1,...,n$ which compete for winning a prize in an all-pay auction with completely informed bidders. The prize can, for instance, be winning a business contract in a contest, and the firm’s valuation $v_i$ denotes the operating business surplus which this firm generates from receiving and fulfilling this business contract. Let firms be sorted and numbered such that $v_1 \geq v_2 > ... > v_n$.7

Each firm $i$ can make a bid $x_i \geq 0$. It has to pay this bid in full, in-

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6For all-pay auctions with externalities only partial results exist. The symmetric case in which the prize is a public good to some group of competitors that has been considered in Baik, Kim and Na (2001), is one example.

7Cases with further non-strict inequalities, particularly with $v_2 = v_3$, lead to a multiplicity of equilibria that is avoided here for simplicity. For a complete description of the equilibria for other non-strict inequalities in the all-pay auction with complete information and without externalities see Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996).
dependent of whether the firm wins the prize or not. The bid in an all-pay auction is like an up-front effort that is irreversibly lost once it is chosen. In what follows, the ‘bid’ will sometimes be called ‘the firm’s effort’ in order to emphasize its non-contingent nature.

The outcome of the all-pay auction is determined as follows. The prize is awarded to the firm that makes the highest effort. If several firms make the same highest effort, the prize is awarded to each of these firms with the same probability. More formally, let $M$ denote the set of firms $j$ for which $x_j \geq x_k$ for all $k \in N$, and let $\#M$ be the number of firms in $M$. The probability that $i$ wins the contest is a function of all contestants’ efforts, and is denoted as

$$p_i = p_i(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n) = \frac{1}{\#M} \text{ if } i \in M \text{ and } p_i = 0 \text{ otherwise.} \quad (1)$$

Given the operating surplus $v_i$, bid cost $x_i$ and the contest success function $p_i$, we can define the operating profit of a firm as

$$\pi_i = p_i v_i - x_i. \quad (2)$$

If firms do not own shares in another firm, this operating profit is what the firm maximizes and what is distributed among the shareholders.

Firms may own or acquire shares in other firms. For instance, firm $i$ may own a minority share $\theta_{ij}$ in firm $j$. To be ‘silent’, the minority share should be limited to $\theta_{ij} \in [0, 1/2)$. One could also consider cross ownership or the equilibrium ownership structure of shares more generally, but, in what follows, I restrict attention to $\theta_{kl} \equiv 0$ for all firms $k \neq i$ and $l \neq j$. I ask how this transaction changes the nature of the all-pay auction equilibrium.

What makes this question interesting is that a merger or take-over may be subject to merger control in situations in which obtaining a silent minority share is not.
If firm $i$ owns a share $\theta_{ij}$ in firm $j$, this changes the overall profit of this firm to

$$W_i = \pi_i + \theta_{ij} \pi_j.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

Each firm will generally maximize this overall firm profit $W_i$, which, for $\theta_{ij} = 0$ reduces to $W_i = \pi_i$.\(^9\)

A silent share ownership $\theta_{ij}$ will be called \textit{mutually profitable} if a change in the ownership structure from $\theta_{ij} = 0$ to this $\theta_{ij} > 0$ increases the sum of operating profits of firms $i$ and $j$. Mutual profitability is a sufficient condition for a mutually beneficial trade of shares between the owners of firm $i$ and the owners of firm $j$. Which silent share ownership is mutually profitable will be analysed, but the market mechanism that is used to implement this trade is not considered.\(^{10}\)

A second question will be whether the silent share ownership increases or decreases the expected value that is generated from the equilibrium allocation of the prize. The value

$$V = \frac{1}{v_1} \sum_{k=1}^{k=n} p_k v_k$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

\(^9\)One could also go one step further and consider the private ownership structure of firms and how the private owners may induce managers not to maximize firm profit but some other objective function (see, e.g., Bolle and Güth, 1992). In line with the standard assumptions in the literature on firm crossholdings, however, I will assume firms to maximize their own overall profit. This is in line with full rationality, for instance, if each firm is controlled by majority shareholders who do not have cross-holdings in competitors of this firm.

\(^{10}\)Depending on the dispersion of share ownership, such deals may also cause free rider problems, and the trading mechanism, together with the initial share ownership, will influence the share price for which the share trading may take place. The focus here is constrained to the question whether a mutually profitable deal exists.
will be called *measure of social value* of the equilibrium allocation of the prize. The maximum social value is reached if $V = 1$, i.e., if the firm with the highest valuation $v_1$ receives the prize with probability 1. Social value $V$ will generally be a function of $\theta_{ij}$, as ownership shares may change the equilibrium win probabilities $p_i$. This social value is also an appropriate measure of social welfare in cases in which effort is simply a transfer.

3 The equilibrium for $\theta_{ij} = 0$

If $\theta_{ij} = 0$, firms compete in an all-pay auction without externalities and each firm $i$ maximizes $\pi_i$ as in (2). The equilibrium has been fully described by Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996) for any type of prize structure. The result applied to the firms context here is stated as

**Proposition 1** (Baye, Kovenock and deVries, 1996) *Let there be $n$ firms with valuations $v_1 \geq v_2 > \ldots > v_n$ of the prize. Let each firm maximize (2) by a choice of non-negative effort $x_i$ in an all-pay auction with complete information. The unique auction equilibrium is in mixed strategies as follows. Firm 1 chooses effort $x_1 \in (0, v_2]$ according to a cumulative distribution function

$$F_1(x_1) = x_1/v_2,$$

(5)

firm 2 chooses effort $x_2 \in [0, v_2]$ according to

$$F_2(x_2) = (1 - (v_2/v_1)) + x_2/v_1,$$

(6)

and firms $k = 3, \ldots n$ choose zero effort. The equilibrium expected efforts are

$$Ex_1^* = v_2/2, \quad Ex_2^* = \frac{v_2v_3}{2v_1}, \quad \text{and} \quad x_k^* \equiv 0 \text{ for } k = 3, \ldots n,$$

(7)
and the payoffs are
\[ \pi^*_1 = v_1 - v_2 \quad \text{and} \quad \pi^*_k = 0 \quad \text{for all} \quad k = 2, \ldots, n. \quad (8) \]

This result has been used in many applications. It is well known by now, and a proof will not be repeated here. The equilibrium of the full-information all pay auction is in mixed strategies. Only the two top firms (the ones who value winning the auction most highly) participate in the auction and make positive bids. They randomize their effort uniformly in the interval between zero and \( v_2 \), and choose a density that makes the only rival bidder who actively participates just indifferent with respect to all effort choices in this interval. The solution is characterized by a mass point at zero effort for the player with the second highest valuation \( v_2 \). The solution translates into expected effort choices and payoffs that are fairly simple and depend only on \( v_2 \) and on the difference between \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \). In particular, only the player who values winning the most gets a positive payoff, and this payoff is equal to the difference \( v_1 - v_2 \) between this player’s own valuation of winning and the second highest valuation of winning. The allocation of the prize in the all-pay auction with complete information is inefficient, at least in expectation, unless \( v_1 = v_2 \). The social value is \( V = 1 - \frac{v_2 - v_1}{v_1} \). A key property of this equilibrium for explaining the results in what follows is that an increase in \( v_1 \) does not change firm 1’s equilibrium strategies, but changes player 2’s bidding behavior and increases the probability that player 2 bids zero.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\) Goeree, Anderson and Holt (1998) discuss the comparative static properties of all-pay auctions with complete information. These properties motivate them to consider ‘noisy’ players, as in Goeree, Anderson and Holt (1998) and in Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998).
4 Minority ownership

Consider now a minority shareholding $\theta_{ij} > 0$ of firm $i$ in firm $j$ for one firm $i$ and one firm $j$. The ownership share of firm $i$ in firm $j$ changes the valuation firm $i$ attributes to the prize compared to the operating surplus, and the resulting valuation depends on the bidding behavior of other firms. Let $F_k(x)$ be the cumulative distribution function of bids by firm $k$. To illustrate, adopt for a moment the tie-breaking rule that $i$ wins if $x_i = \max\{...x_k,...\}$, and let $j$ have no mass point at $x_i$. Then (3) for a given $x_i$ can be rewritten for some given bid level $x_i$ as

$$W_i(x_i) = \prod_{k \notin \{i,j\}} F_k(x_i) F_j(x_i) v_i - x_i + \theta_{ij} v_j \int_{x_i}^{\infty} \prod_{k \notin \{i,j\}} F_k(x_j) dF_j(x_j) - \theta_{ij} E(x_j),$$

(9)

where the first two terms are $i$’s operating profit and the second two terms are $i$’s profit from silent share-ownership. An increase in $x_i$ has a direct effect via $i$’s operating profit and an indirect effect on $i$’s overall profit of

$$\frac{\partial W_i}{\partial \pi_j} \frac{\partial \pi_j}{\partial x_i} = -\theta_{ij} v_j \prod_{k \notin \{i,j\}} F_k(x_i) dF_j(x_i).$$

A first result is

**Proposition 2** If $\theta_{ij} > 0$ with $i < j$ and $j \geq 3$ or if $\theta_{ij} > 0$ in firm $j < i$ for $i \geq 3$, the bidding strategies as in Proposition 1 constitute an equilibrium. Such shareholdings do not change operating profits or overall profits of firms in the equilibrium.

**Proof.** Note that $W_k = \pi_k = p_k v_k - x_k$ for all $k \neq i$, and $W_i = p_i v_i - x_i + \theta_{ij} [p_j v_j - x_j]$. Suppose all firms anticipate that all other firms choose the candidate equilibrium bid strategies as in Proposition 1. All firms $k \neq i$
maximize $\pi_k = p_k v_k - x_k$. Then the candidate equilibrium strategies in Proposition 1 are the optimal replies for all $k \neq i$. Moreover, (5) and (6), together with $F_k(0) = 1$ for all $k \in \{3, 4, \ldots, n\}\{i\}$, implies that $p_k = 0$ for $k \geq 3$. Therefore, $W_i$ also reduces to $W_i = p_i v_i - x_i = \pi_i$, making $F_i$ as in Proposition 1 an optimal reply.

Intuitively, if firms own shares in inactive firms, or if inactive firms own shares in other firms, this does not change the incentives of active firms. Interesting implications of a firm’s ownership shares in another firm can be expected only for ownership shares $\theta_{12}$ and $\theta_{21}$. The case $\theta_{12} > 0$ is considered first.

**Proposition 3** (i) if $v_1 - \theta_{12} v_2 \in (v_2, v_1]$ then an equilibrium exists with $\pi_k = W_k = 0$ for all $k \geq 2$ and

$$W_1 = v_1 - v_2 - \theta_{12} \frac{(v_2)^2}{2(v_1 - \theta_{12} v_2)}.$$  

Share ownership in this interval is not mutually profitable. (ii) if $v_1 - \theta_{12} v_2 \in (v_3, v_2)$, then an equilibrium exists with $\pi_k = W_k = 0$ for all $k \geq 3$,

$$W_2 = \pi_2 = (1 + \theta_{12}) v_2 - v_1$$

and

$$\pi_1 = 0 \text{ and } W_1 = \theta_{12} (v_2 - \frac{v_1 - \theta_{12} v_2}{2}).$$

Share ownership in this interval is mutually profitable iff $\theta_{12} v_2 > 2(v_1 - v_2)$.

A proof is in the Appendix. Intuitively, if $\theta_{12}$ is small as in (i) then the nature of the equilibrium is not changed, compared to $\theta_{12} = 0$. Only firms 1 and 2 compete against each other. Firm 1’s valuation of winning equals the difference between its own operating surplus $v_1$ and $\theta_{12} v_2$ (what it gets from
losing), compared to $\theta_{12} = 0$. Firm 2 has the same prize of winning, but the prize for firm 1 is reduced. The difference between valuations of winning still determines the prize for the firm with the higher valuation, the firm with the second highest valuation competes actively but makes zero profit, and all other firms prefer to be inactive. If $\theta_{12}$ is sufficiently large to make $v_3 < v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2 < v_2$ as in (ii), when firms 1 and 2 compete, firm 2 still values the prize of winning at $v_2$. However, playing against firm 2, firm 1 gains only $v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2$ if the prize is awarded to 1 and not to 2, and this net prize of winning is so small that firm 2 values winning the prize more highly than firm 1. The firms switch ranks as regards prize valuations. As known from Proposition 1, the rank and the differences in valuations determine payoffs. Firm 2 receives a positive operating profit and firm 1 receives an operating profit of zero, and a positive overall profit, due to its shareholdings in firm 2.

**Proposition 4**  
If $v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2 \in ((1 - \frac{\theta_{12}}{2})v_3, \frac{1}{2})$ then an equilibrium exists in which only firms 2 and 3 are active, and with $\pi_k = W_k = 0$ for all $k = 2, 4, 5, \ldots n$, $\pi_1 = 0$, $W_2 = \pi_2 = v_2 - v_3$ and $W_1 = \theta_{12}(v_2 - v_3)$. Moreover, an ownership share of this size is mutually profitable if and only if $v_1 - v_2 < v_2 - v_3$.

A proof is in the Appendix. The most interesting result in Proposition 4 is the possibility that firm 1, which has the highest operating surplus from winning the auction, becomes passive and still makes higher profits than in the equilibrium with $\theta_{12} = 0$. Intuitively, without minority shareholdings, firm 1 and firm 2 may compete tightly and dissipate most, or all, of the operating surplus that can be obtained from winning the prize in the auction. If, instead, firm 1 successfully commits to not making bids, the difference
between firm 2’s and firm 3’s valuations of winning describes the total rent that is allocated among firms, and, if this difference is larger than the difference in the valuations \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \) of the prize for firms 1 and 2, total industry profit goes up for this \( \theta_{12} \), compared to \( \theta_{12} = 0 \). Even firm 1, and its owners, can benefit from this, as all this rent accrues in firm 2 and firm 1 receives a share in these profits that equals its ownership share in firm 2. The only problem is to make firm 1 credibly commit to bidding zero.

As discussed in Proposition 4, this will work only if firm 1’s ownership share in firm 2 is sufficiently large, if the difference in the valuations of the prize for firms 1 and 2 is small, and if the difference in prizes between \( v_2 \) and \( v_3 \) is larger than the difference between \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \), but also not too large. To see that the parameter range with \( \theta_{12} < 1/2 \) for which \( v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2 > (1 - \frac{\theta_{12}}{2})v_3 \) holds is non-empty, note that this condition reduces to \( v_3 > \frac{2}{3}v_2 \) for \( (v_1 - v_2) \to 0 \) and \( \theta_{12} = 1/2 \).

The result is based on a mechanism that is explored in a paper by Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1993). They consider the problem of an auction designer to be whether to exclude the bidder who -in terms of this paper- has the highest operating surplus from winning the prize. The designer is interested in high total effort which is increasing in the valuation of winning of the bidder who has the second highest valuation, and decreasing in the difference between the highest and the second highest valuation of winning. In the absence of firms’ ownership shares in other firms, excluding the bidder with the highest operating profit is worthwhile from the designer’s perspective if it improves on competitive balance, and hence, total expected effort. In Proposition 4, the contestant with the highest operating surplus may choose an ownership structure that commits himself to not being active
in the contest, if this sufficiently increases competitive imbalance. Unlike the contest designer who likes much effort, and hence, likes to increase competitive balance, the competitors themselves are interested in generating a high competitive imbalance, as a larger difference between them reduces contest effort.

Consider now the intermediate range of $\theta_{12}$ that is not covered by Propositions 3 and 4.

**Proposition 5** If $v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2 \in ((1 - \frac{\theta_{12}}{2})v_3, v_3)$ no equilibrium exists in which only two firms are active. For any equilibrium, a sufficient condition for $\theta_{12}$ in this range to be mutually profitable is $v_1 - v_2 < v_2 - v_3$.

A proof is in the Appendix. Intuitively, if firm 1 loses, it still cares about whether firm 2 or some other firm (e.g., firm 3) wins the prize. Competing against firm 2, firm 1 is not very aggressive as some of the gains of firm 2 make firm 1 also gain, due to the shareholdings. However, competing against firm 3, firm 1’s stake is larger and equal to the full valuation $v_1$ of the prize. The fact that firm 1 is not indifferent to whom it competes with generates an additional discontinuity in the problem and makes it difficult to address the question of existence, or to characterize an equilibrium. An intuition for why the minority share is mutually profitable in an equilibrium if $v_1 - v_2 < v_2 - v_3$ is based on the insight that bids higher than $x = v_3$ will not occur in the equilibrium, which yields some lower limit for firm 2’s operating profits.

So far only profitability aspects have been considered.

**Proposition 6** Consider $\theta_{12} > 0$: In the equilibria that are characterized in Proposition 3 and 4, the social value $V(\theta_{12}) < V(0)$. 

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Proof. The result follows from \( p_1(\theta_{12} = 0) > p(\theta_{12} > 0) \) for all \( \theta_{12} > 0 \) and \( p_1(\theta_{12} = 0) + p_2(\theta_{12} = 0) = 1 \geq p_1(\theta_{12} > 0) + p_2(\theta_{12} > 0) \) for all \( \theta_{12} > 0 \). □

If firm 1 owns a stake in firm 2, this makes firm 1 a less aggressive bidder, up to the point where firm 1 becomes even fully inactive. Generally, this makes it less likely that firm 1 which has the highest \( v_1 \) wins, and, once only firms 2 and 3 are active, it becomes possible that firm 3, that values the prize by even less than firm 2 does, will win the prize.

The case \( \theta_{21} > 0 \) is considered next.

Proposition 7 For \( \theta_{21} \in [0, \min\{v_2 - v_3, \frac{1}{2}\}] \) an equilibrium exists with the following properties: only firms 1 and 2 make positive bids. \( W_1 = \pi_1 = v_1 - (v_2 - \theta_{21} v_1), W_2 = \theta_{12} \pi_1, \pi_2 = 0, W_k = \pi_k = 0 \) for all \( k > 2 \). Moreover, social value \( V \) is increasing in \( \theta_{21} \) on this interval.

A proof is in the Appendix. If firm 2 owns some shares in firm 1, and if the ownership share is small enough, firms 1 and 2 will remain to be the only firms that are active in the equilibrium. Hence, all other firms’ operating profits are zero. Moreover, as long as firm 1 and firm 2 are the only active firms, firm 2’s ownership share in firm 1 reduces the overall value which firm 2 attributes to winning, as firm 2 receives \( \theta_{21} v_1 \) even if firm 2 loses, and \( v_2 \) if it wins. The overall value that firm 1 attributes to winning is unchanged. Accordingly, as regards the bidding incentives, the share ownership in firm 1 is very similar to a reduction in firm 2’s valuation of winning. It increases the difference in the two firms’ overall valuations of winning and increases firm 1’s profits. However, as firm 2 now owns a share in firm 1’s profits, firm 2 receives a share in firm 1’s operating profit. Also, the increase in the difference in overall valuation of winning makes it more likely that firm 1 wins the prize, and this increases \( V \).
For small ownership shares, this reasoning applies monotonically for any further increase in the ownership share. However, as the difference in valuations increases, the overall valuation of winning for firm 2 becomes smaller and smaller. Once it drops below $v_3$, the nature of the equilibrium changes. Firm 3 becomes an active player. At least, the equilibrium that underlies Proposition 7 and is characterized in the proof of the proposition no longer continues to exist. Given the candidate equilibrium strategies (19) and (20), firm 3 would not remain inactive, but would bid higher than $v_2 - \theta_{21}v_1$.

There is again an intermediate range in which the equilibrium cannot be one in which only two players are active, and it is difficult to obtain a closed form solution for an equilibrium in this range. However, the mutual profitability of shareholdings $\theta_{21}$ can again be limited from below:

**Proposition 8** The sum of operating profits of firms 1 and 2 in an equilibrium with $v_2 - \theta_{21}v_1 < v_3$ is at least equal to $v_1 - v_3$.

Again, the proof is in the Appendix. The equilibrium can be fully characterized as soon as $\theta_{21}$ becomes sufficiently large and also yields an intuition for the profitability result in Proposition 8:

**Proposition 9** If

$$(v_1 - \frac{v_3}{2})\theta_{21} > v_2 - v_3 \text{ and } v_2 > \theta_{21}\frac{v_1}{2}.$$ (10)

then an equilibrium exists in which only firms 1 and 3 are active. The sum of overall profits for firms 1 and 2 are $v_1 - v_3$, and $V(\theta_{21})$ is smaller than $V(0)$ iff $v_3(v_1 - v_3) < v_2(v_1 - v_2)$.

As shown in the proof in the Appendix, firm 2 may become inactive in the bidding process if it owns a sufficiently large share in firm 1. Such
shareholdings reduce the overall value that firm 2 attributes to winning vis-
a-vis firm 1, and may reduce this value sufficiently to make firm 3 an active
bidder. As a consequence, only firms 1 and 3 compete actively, and firm 2
enjoys some passive income from share ownership. This is profitable from
the joint perspective of firms 1 and 2 as it increases firm 1’s operating profit
to $v_1 - v_3$, and keeps firm 2’s operating profit at zero. However, when firm 2
becomes inactive, firm 3 becomes active. This has a negative impact for firm
2: with all firms except firm 1 and firm 2 inactive, if firm 2 does not win, firm
1 wins and firm 2 receives some shareholdership returns. Once firm 3 is active,
firm 3 may also win, in which case firm 2 does not receive shareholdership
returns. The condition (10) makes sure that the shareholdership returns from
ownership in firm 1 are sufficiently large in the equilibrium in which only firm
1 and firm 3 are active so as to make it not attractive for firm 2 to make a
positive bid.

5 Conclusions

Minority shareholdings can, but need not, increase firms’ and industry profit
in markets of the all-pay auction type. Particularly if the silent shareholdings
a firm purchases in another firm increase the difference in valuation of winning
for the firms who have the highest operating surpluses from winning the
competition, the acquisition of such shareholdings is likely to benefit the
owners of both firms that are involved in this acquisition. For a profit increase
to emerge from silent ownership, the firm that has the highest operating
surplus from winning the auction (the ‘strongest’ firm) may purchase shares
in the firm that has the second highest operating surplus from winning or
vice versa. The first type of share purchase typically decreases the efficiency of the prize allocation in the auction, the second type of share purchase can increase efficiency. This result is of interest for competition authorities when evaluating silent shareholdings. Generally, silent share ownership is not neutral with respect to firm profits and efficiency, and firm profits and efficiency need not be aligned. Competition authorities may treat profitable share ownership differently, depending whether a stronger firm that has a higher operating surplus from winning the competition purchases shares in a weaker firm, or whether a weaker firm, i.e., a firm that has a smaller operating surplus from winning the competition purchases shares in a stronger competitor.

6 Appendix

Proof of Proposition 3. (i) For \( v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2 \in (v_2, v_1) \) consider the cumulative distribution functions \( F_k(0) = 1 \) for all \( k = 3, \ldots, n \),

\[
F_1(x) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{x}{v_2} & \text{for } x \in (0, v_2] \\
1 & \text{for } x > v_2 
\end{cases} \tag{11}
\]

and

\[
F_2 = \begin{cases} 
(1 - \frac{v_2}{v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2}) + \frac{x}{v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2} & \text{for } x \in [0, v_2] \\
1 & \text{for } x > v_2 
\end{cases} \tag{12}
\]

as candidate equilibrium strategies. Note that \( \pi_k(x_k) = F_1(x_k)F_2(x_k)v_k - x_k < 0 \) for all \( x_k > 0 \). Hence, \( F_k(0) = 1 \) is an optimal reply for \( k = 3, \ldots, n \). Next, using \( W_2 = \pi_2 \) and inserting (11) in (2), \( \pi_2(x_2) = \frac{x_2}{v_2}v_2 - x_2 = 0 \) for all \( x_2 \in [0, v_2] \) and equal to \( v_2 - x_2 < 0 \) for \( x_2 > v_2 \). Accordingly, any mixed strategy \( F_2 \) on the support \([0, v_2]\) is optimal for firm 2, in particular \( F_2 \) as
in (12). Finally, inserting the candidate equilibrium cumulative distribution functions for \( k = 2, \ldots, n \), \( W_1(x_1) \) becomes equal to \( v_1 - v_2 - \theta_{12} \frac{(v_2)^2}{2(v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2)} \) for \( x_1 \in (0, v_2] \), and equal to \( v_1 - x_1 - \theta_{12} \frac{(v_2)^2}{2(v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2)} \) for \( x_1 > v_2 \), and hence, strictly smaller for \( x_1 > v_2 \) than for \( x_1 \in (0, v_2] \). This makes any bid \( x_1 \in (0, v_2) \) optimal and makes the candidate equilibrium strategy \( F_1(x) \) as in (11) an optimal reply.

As regards mutual profitability, the sum of profits is \( \pi_1 + \pi_2 = (v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2) - v_2 < v_1 - v_2 \).

(ii) For \( v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2 \in (v_3, v_2) \), consider the following cumulative distribution functions as candidate equilibrium strategies:

\[
F_1(x) = \begin{cases} 
1 - \frac{v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2}{v_2} + \frac{x}{v_2} & \text{for } x \in [0, v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2) \\
1 & \text{for } x > v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2 
\end{cases}
\]  

and

\[
F_2(x) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{x}{v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2} & \text{for } x \in [0, v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2) \\
1 & \text{for } x > v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2. 
\end{cases}
\]

Consider whether these are optimal replies to each other. Note that \( W_k = \pi_k(x_k) = F_1(x_k)F_2(x_k)v_k - x_k < 0 \) for all \( x_k > 0 \). Hence, \( x_k = 0 \) is an optimal reply for \( k = 3, \ldots, n \). Next, \( W_2(x_2) = \pi_2(x_2) = (1 - \frac{v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2}{v_2} + \frac{x}{v_2})v_2 - x = v_2 - [v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2] \) for all \( x_2 \in [0, v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2] \) and smaller for any \( x_2 > v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2 \). Accordingly, any randomization \( F_2 \) on \([0, v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2]\) is optimal for firm 2, and this makes \( F_2 \) as in (14) an optimal reply. Finally, inserting the candidate equilibrium cumulative distribution functions for \( k = 2, \ldots, n \), \( W_1(x_1) = \theta_{12}(v_2 - \frac{v_1 + \theta_{12}v_2}{2}) \) for \( x_1 \in [0, v_2] \), and smaller for \( x_1 > v_2 \). This makes any randomization of \( x_1 \) on \((0, v_2)\) optimal and makes \( F_1 \) as in (13) an optimal reply.
As regards the sum of operating profits, \( W_1(\theta_{12}) + (1 - \theta_{12})W_2(\theta_{12}) = \pi_1 + \pi_2 = (v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2) - v_2 > v_1 - v_2 \) iff \( 2(v_1 - v_2) < \theta_{12}v_2 \). \qed

**Proof of Proposition 4.** Firms \( k = 2, \ldots, n \) maximize \( W_k = \pi_k = p_kv_k - x_k \). Suppose firm 1 abstains from bidding. Then the results from Proposition 1 apply to the set of firms \( \{2, 3, \ldots, n\} \) with firms 2 and 3 replacing firms 1 and 2. The unique equilibrium is then characterized by the mixed strategies \( x_2 \in (0, v_3] \) distributed according to

\[
F_2(x) = \frac{x}{v_3}
\]  

(15)

and \( x_3 \in [0, v_3] \) distributed according to

\[
F_3(x) = (1 - \frac{v_3}{v_2}) + \frac{x}{v_2}
\]  

and \( x_i \equiv 0 \) for all \( i = 4, \ldots, n \). For firm 1 the choice \( x_1 \equiv 0 \) is indeed optimal given (15) and (16). Firm 1’s payoff from bidding \( x_1 \geq 0 \) is

\[
\pi_1(x_1) = F_2(x_1)F_3(x_1)v_1 - x_1 + \theta_{12} \left[ v_2 \int_{x_1}^{\infty} F_3(x_2)dF_2(x_2) - E(x_2) \right],
\]  

(17)

where \( E(x_2) \) denotes the expected effort of firm 2. The last term is firm 1’s share in firm 2’s expected profit as a function of \( x_1 \), given that firms \( k > 3 \) choose \( x_k = 0 \). Substituting (15) and (16) into (17) yields

\[
\frac{x_1v_2 - x_1v_3 + (x_1)^2}{v_3v_2}v_1 - x_1 + \theta_{12} \left[ v_2 - v_3 - \frac{v_2 - v_3}{v_3}x_1 - \frac{(x_1)^2}{2v_3} \right].
\]  

(18)

The term (18) is quadratic in \( x_1 \) and the quadratic term enters positively if \( \frac{v_1}{v_2v_3} > \theta_{12} \frac{1}{2v_3} \), which is always fulfilled, as \( \theta_{12} < 1/2 \) and \( v_1 \geq v_2 \). Hence, this function is strictly convex in \( x_1 \) and has its global maximum on the interval \([0, v_3]\) either at \( x_1 = 0 \) or at \( x_1 = v_3 \). From inserting \( x_1 = 0 \) and \( x_1 = v_3 \) in (17) one gets \( \pi_1(0) = \theta_{12}(v_2-v_3) \), and \( \pi_1(v_3) = v_1-v_3-\theta_{12}v_3/2 \). Accordingly,
\[ x_1 = 0 \text{ is optimal given (15) and (16) if } \theta_{12}(v_2 - v_3) > v_1 - v_3 - \theta_{12}v_3/2, \text{ and this is equivalent to } v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2 < (1 - \frac{\theta_{12}}{2})v_3. \] This shows that \( F_1(0) = 1 \) is indeed an optimal reply.

As regards the sum of the operating profits, \( \pi_1(0) + \pi_2(0) = v_1 - v_2 \), and \( \pi_1(\theta_{12}) + \pi_2(\theta_{12}) = v_2 - v_3 \) for \( \theta_{12} \) with \( (v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2) \in ((1 - \frac{\theta_{12}}{2})v_3, \frac{v_3}{2}) \). □

**Proof of Proposition 5.** Returning to the proof of Proposition 4, for \( F_1(0) = 1 = F_k(0) \) for \( k = 4, \ldots, n \), if firm 1 does not make positive bids, the unique equilibrium cumulative distribution functions \( F_2 \) and \( F_3 \) are given by (15) and (16). However, \( x_1 = v_3 \) becomes superior to \( x_1 = 0 \) given these strategies if \( v_1 - \theta_{12}v_2 \in ((1 - \frac{\theta_{12}}{2})v_3, v_3) \). This shows that there is no equilibrium in which only firms 2 and 3 make positive bids.

Consider next \( x_k \equiv 0 \) for all \( k = 3, \ldots, n \). A bid \( \hat{x}_1 \in (v_3 - \epsilon, v_3) \) turns out to be strictly dominated by \( x_1 = \epsilon \) for sufficiently small \( \epsilon \), whatever firm 2’s strategy is. A choice \( x_1 = \epsilon \) makes either firm 1 or firm 2 win. Hence, the payoff for firm 1 is

\[ W_1(\epsilon) \geq \theta_{12}v_2 - \epsilon - \theta_{12}E(x_2). \]

If firm 1 chooses \( \hat{x}_1 \in (v_3 - \epsilon, v_3) \) then

\[ W_1(\hat{x}_1) \leq v_1 - (v_3 - \epsilon) - \theta_{12}E(x_2). \]

Accordingly, \( W_1(\epsilon) > W_1(\hat{x}_1) \) if \( \theta_{12}v_2 - v_1 + v_3 > 0 \) for sufficiently small \( \epsilon \). Moreover, \( x_1 < v_3 - \epsilon \) also implies that \( x_2 < v_3 - \epsilon \). Accordingly, firm 3 could make a positive payoff, for instance, by choosing \( x_3 = v_3 - \epsilon \), and, hence, \( F_3(0) = 1 \) is not optimal. This shows that there is no equilibrium in which only firms 1 and 2 are active.

Finally, an equilibrium in which only firms 1 and 3 are active is not feasible. \( W_2 = 0 \) in such an equilibrium. Moreover, neither firm 1 nor firm
3 would make bids higher than \( v_3 \). Hence, firm 2 could make positive profit by making a bit in the interval \( x_2 \in (v_3, v_2) \). Hence, a contradiction.

Note that firm 3 (or even firms \( k > 3 \)) would never make bids higher than the operating surplus it could obtain from winning: \( x_k \leq v_3 \) for \( k \geq 3 \). Accordingly, the prize goes to firm 1 or firm 2 with probability 1 if at least one of them makes a bid equal to \( v_3 + \epsilon \) for small positive \( \epsilon \). Further, if \( F_k(x) = 1 \) for all \( x > v_3 \) and \( k \geq 3 \), then firm 1 will never bid more than \( v_3 + (\epsilon/2) \). Accordingly, for firm 2, \( W_2 = \pi_2 \geq v_2 - (v_3 + \epsilon) \). Further, firm 1 maximizes \( W_1 = p_1 v_1 - x_1 + \theta_1 v_2 \). For instance for a choice \( x_1 = 0 \). This implies that \( \pi_1 = W_1 - \theta_1 v_2 \geq 0 \). In turn, \( \pi_1 + \pi_2 > \pi_2 \geq v_2 - v_3 - \epsilon \). \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 7.** The strategies

\[
F_1(x_1) = \frac{x_1}{v_2 - \theta_2 v_1} \text{ with } x_1 \in [0, v_2 - \theta_2 v_1], \tag{19}
\]

\[
F_2(x_2) = (1 - \frac{v_2 - \theta_2 v_1}{v_1}) \frac{x_2}{v_1} \text{ with } x_2 \in [0, v_2 - \theta_2 v_1] \tag{20}
\]

and \( x_k \equiv 0 \) for all \( k = 3, \ldots, n \) constitute an equilibrium for the following reasons. Firm 1 values winning by \( v_1 \) and attributes a value of zero to the event of any other firm winning the prize. For (20) and \( x_k \equiv 0 \) for all \( k = 3, \ldots, n \) firm 1’s payoff is equal to \( v_1 - (v_2 - \theta_2 v_1) \) for any \( x_1 \in (0, v_2 - \theta_2 v_1) \), and smaller than this payoff for all other choices of \( x_1 \). Hence, (19) is an optimal reply for firm 1. It is assumed in Proposition 7 that \( \theta_{21} < \frac{v_2 - v_3}{v_1} \). Hence, firms \( k = 3, \ldots, n \) value winning the prize by less than \( v_2 - \theta_{21} v_1 \). Given (19), these firms strictly maximize their payoff by a choice of effort \( x_k \equiv 0 \). It remains to show that (20) is an optimal reply for firm 2. Given (19) for firm 1 and \( x_k \equiv 0 \) for \( k = 3, \ldots, n \) firm 2’s payoff is \( W_2(x_2) = \)
\( F_1(x_2)v_2 + (1 - F_1(x_2))\theta_{21}v_1 - x_2 - \theta_{21}E(x_1) \), and can be rewritten as
\[
W_2(x_2) = F_1(x_2)(v_2 - \theta_{21}v_1) - x_2 + \theta_{21}(v_1 - E(x_1)).
\] (21)

The third term on the right-hand side in (21) is a constant with respect to \( x_2 \), and is strictly positive, and it does not matter for firm 2’s optimization choice. Hence, firm 2 behaves like a firm with a valuation of the prize that equals \( v_2 - \theta_{21}v_1 \). Given (19), this makes all \( x_2 \in [0, v_2 - \theta_{21}v_1] \) yield the same payoff for firm 2, and this payoff is larger than for any other \( x_2 \notin [0, v_2 - \theta_{21}v_1] \).

Any mixed strategy on the support \([0, v_2 - \theta_{21}v_1]\) is then an optimal reply. The equilibrium that is described by (19) and (20) and \( x_k = 0 \) for all other firms \( k = 3, \ldots, n \) has the properties outlined in the proposition. Aggregate payoff of firms is \( v_1 - (v_2 - \theta_{21}v_1) \), and this is strictly increasing in \( \theta_{21} \). Moreover, \( V \) increases in \( \theta_{21} \) as \( \frac{\partial \pi_1}{\partial \theta_{21}} = -\frac{\partial \pi_2}{\partial \theta_{21}} > 0 \). □

**Proof of Proposition 8.** Consider \( v_2 - \theta_{21}v_1 \in (v_3 - \theta_{21}\frac{m}{\pi_1}, v_3) \). Firms \( k \geq 3 \) will not bid higher than \( x_k = v_3 \). For this reason, any bid \( \hat{x}_2 > v_3 \) by firm 2 is dominated by a bid in the range \( x_2 \in (v_3, \hat{x}_2) \). Accordingly, firm 2 will not make a bid higher than \( v_3 + \epsilon \). In turn, this implies that firm 1 will not bid higher than \( v_3 + 2\epsilon \). Accordingly, firm 1’s operating profit is bounded from below by \( v_1 - v_3 - \epsilon \). Moreover, as \( W_2 = \pi_2 + \theta_{21}\pi_1 \), this overall profit is bounded from below by \( \theta_{21}\pi_1 \), as this overall profit can be attained by \( x_2 = 0 \). Hence, \( \pi_2 \) is bounded from below by 0. Accordingly, the sum of operating profits must be bounded from below by \( v_1 - v_3 - \epsilon \). Now consider \( \epsilon \to 0 \). □

**Proof of Proposition 9.** Suppose that firm 2 does not make positive bids: \( x_2 \equiv 0 \). Then the equilibrium among the remaining firms is characterized in analogy to Proposition 1 as in Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996),
with firm 3 assuming the role of firm 2. The unique mixed strategies are characterized by
\[ F_1(x) = \frac{x}{v_3} \text{ for } x \in [0, v_3] \] (22)
and
\[ F_3(x) = 1 - \frac{v_3}{v_1} + \frac{x}{v_1} \text{ for } x \in [0, v_3]. \] (23)

For (22) and (23) \( x_2 = 0 \) is indeed optimal for firm 2 if conditions (10) hold.

Firm 2’s overall payoff from bidding \( x_2 \geq 0 \) is
\[ W_2(x_2) = F_1(x_2)F_3(x_2)v_2 - x_2 + \theta_{21} \left[ v_1 \int_{x_2}^{\infty} F_3(x_1)dF_1(x_1) - \frac{v_3}{2} \right]. \] (24)
Substitution of (22) and (23) into (24) yields
\[ W_2(x_2) = \frac{x_2 v_1 - v_3 + x_2 v_2}{v_3} - x_2 + \theta_{21} \left[ v_1 - v_3 - \left( \frac{v_1 - v_3}{v_3} x_2 + \frac{1}{2} \frac{x_2 v_2}{v_3} \right) \right]. \] (25)

This expression is a quadratic function in \( x_2 \). The quadratic term enters with a positive sign, as \( \frac{v_2}{v_3} > \theta_{21} \frac{1}{2v_3} \) by the second condition in (10). The function is, therefore, strictly convex and has its global maximum on the interval \([0, v_3]\) either at 0 or at \( v_3 \). From inserting \( x_2 = 0 \) and \( x_2 = v_3 \) in (24) one gets \( \pi_1(0) = \theta_{21}(v_1 - v_3) \), and \( \pi_1(v_3) = v_2 - v_3 - \theta_{21} \frac{v_2}{2} \). The choice \( x_2 = 0 \) is optimal if \( \theta_{21}(v_1 - v_3) - v_2 + v_3 + \theta_{21} \frac{v_2}{2} > 0 \), which can also be written equivalently as the first condition in (10). The firms’ profits (including earnings from ownership shares) in this equilibrium become equal to \( \pi_1 + \pi_2 = v_1 - v_3 \) and \( \pi_k = 0 \) for all \( k \geq 3 \). Industry profit is increased, now from \( v_1 - v_2 \) to \( v_1 - v_3 \).

Social value is higher in the range of \( \theta_{21} \) for which firm 2 becomes inactive than for \( \theta_{21} = 0 \) if \( V(\theta_{21}) = 1 - \frac{v_3}{2v_1} \frac{v_1 - v_3}{v_1} > 1 - \frac{v_2}{2v_1} \frac{v_1 - v_2}{v_1} = V(0) \). This is true if \( v_3(v_1 - v_3) < v_2(v_1 - v_2) \) \hspace{1cm} \Box
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