Job protection renders minimum wages less harmful
Schöb, Ronnie ;  Thum, Marcel ;  ;  Universität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Main titleJob protection renders minimum wages less harmful
AuthorSchöb, Ronnie
AuthorThum, Marcel
EditorUniversität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
No. of Pages11 S.
Series ; 2011,14 : Economics
KeywordsMinimum wages; unemployment; hidden information; labour market regulation
Classification (DDC)331 Labor economics
AbstractIndividual labour productivities are often unobservable for firms when hiring new workers. Job protection may prevent firms ex post from using information about labour productivities. We show that a binding minimum wage introduced in the presence of job protection will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and full information.
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FU DepartmentDepartment Business and Economics
Other affiliation(s)Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft mit dem Schwerpunkt Internationale Finanzpolitik
Year of publication2011
Type of documentBook
Terms of use/Rights Nutzungsbedingungen
Created at2011-09-21 : 07:13:37
Last changed2016-01-05 : 02:38:24
Static URLhttp://edocs.fu-berlin.de/docs/receive/FUDOCS_document_000000011804