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Outsourcing motives, competitiveness and taxation
König, Jan ;  Universität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Main titleOutsourcing motives, competitiveness and taxation
AuthorKönig, Jan
InstitutionUniversität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
No. of Pages28 S.
Series Discussion paper / School of Business & Economics ; 2010/33 : Economics
Keywordsoutsourcing; cost structure; Cournot-competition; taxation
Classification (DDC)336 Public finance
338 Production
AbstractThis paper shows the strategic aspects of international outsourcing in an
oligopolistic market, if outsourcing is attractive because of fixed cost
savings. We show that outsourcing decisions are strategic substitutes.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that due to decreasing individual output,
intensified competition increases the incentive to save fixed costs of
integrated production and thus leads to more outsourcing. Additionally, we
analyse how domestic costs and taxation affect the equilibrium level of
outsourcing and employment. Here, we find that lower domestic costs
decrease the proportion of outsourcing and therefore, increase employment.
Concerning the impact of taxation, we find that a lower consumption tax on
output decreases outsourcing. In case of a reversed outsourcing motivation,
where outsourcing is associated with lower marginal costs but higher fixed
costs than the domestic production, we show that the opposite effects
concerning competition and taxation occur.
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FU DepartmentDepartment Business and Economics
Other affiliation(s)Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft
Year of publication2010
Type of documentBook
LanguageEnglish
Terms of use/Rights Nutzungsbedingungen
Created at2011-01-05 : 02:15:14
Last changed2014-01-23 : 04:20:16
 
Static URLhttp://edocs.fu-berlin.de/docs/receive/FUDOCS_document_000000009087
ISBN978-3-941240-45-2
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