The economics of debt clearing mechanisms
Börner, Lars ;  Hatfield, John William ;  ;  Universität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Main titleThe economics of debt clearing mechanisms
AuthorBörner, Lars
AuthorHatfield, John William
EditorUniversität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
No. of Pages39 S.
Series ; 2010,27 : Economics
Keywordsmarket design; matching; history of decentralized clearinghouses
Classification (DDC)337 International economics
AbstractWe examine the evolution of decentralized clearinghouse mechanisms from the
13th to the 18th century; in particular, we explore the clearing of non- or limitedtradable
debts like bills of exchange. We construct a theoretical model of these clearinghouse
mechanisms, similar to the models in the theoretical matching literature, and
show that specific decentralized multilateral clearing algorithms known as rescontre,
skontrieren or virement des parties used by merchants were efficient in specific historical
contexts. We can explain both the evolutionary self-organizing emergence of late
medieval and early modern fairs, and its robustness during the 17th and 18th century.
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FU DepartmentDepartment Business and Economics
Other affiliation(s)Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsgeschichte
Year of publication2010
Type of documentBook
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Created at2010-12-06 : 01:44:55
Last changed2016-01-05 : 02:38:21
Static URLhttp://edocs.fu-berlin.de/docs/receive/FUDOCS_document_000000008208