Objekt-Metadaten

International water negotiations under asymmetry, Lessons from the Rhine chlorides dispute settlement (1931 - 2004)
Dieperink, Carel ;  Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik

Main titleInternational water negotiations under asymmetry, Lessons from the Rhine chlorides dispute settlement (1931 - 2004)
AuthorDieperink, Carel
InstitutionFreie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik
No. of Pages1 S.
Series
KeywordsRhine; dispute settlement; water pollution; water quality; negotiations
Classification (DDC)300 Social sciences
AbstractNegotiations concerning the quality of international rivers are not easy, as incongruence
in preferences between upstream and downstream countries generally exists. The Rhine
Chlorides dispute is a clear example of this. The chloride issue has been on the
international water agenda of the Netherlands and the upstream Rhine riparian states for
more than 70 years. The aim of this paper is to give a historical overview of the
settlement of the Rhine chlorides dispute in order to draw some lessons for negotiators
who have to work under comparable conditions of asymmetrical international water
pollution. The case not only shows the complexities in reaching acceptable solutions for
asymmetrical transboundary pollution, but also the importance of sound argumentation,
institutions, side payments, issue framing, issue linking and arbitration.
Documents
pdf-Datei
If your browser can't open the file, please download the file first and then open it
 
FU DepartmentProceedings of the Berlin Conferences on   Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change
Year of publication2010
Type of documentConferencepresentation
LanguageEnglish
Terms of use/Rights Nutzungsbedingungen
Authors commentsE1: Effects of Transboundary Regimes
Created at2010-11-11 : 02:25:00
Last changed2014-01-23 : 04:25:05
 
Static URLhttp://edocs.fu-berlin.de/docs/receive/FUDOCS_document_000000006969
Statistics
 

LOADING...