Political determinants of central bank independence
Müller, Till ;  ;  Universität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Main titlePolitical determinants of central bank independence
AuthorMüller, Till
EditorUniversität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
No. of Pages29 S.
Series ; 2008,19 : Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe
KeywordsCentral Bank Independence, Political Economy, Signaling
Classification (DDC)339 Macroeconomics and related topics
337 International economics
Also published in
AbstractFrom a normative perspective, it is striking that the degree of central bank independence (CBI)
varies considerably across countries. Taking a political economy perspective, this paper
demonstrates how different degrees of CBI may be the result of ‘strategic policy-making’.
While an independent central bank reduces the incumbent politician’s chances to influence
current monetary policy it also raises the costs of future policy changes for political
successors. Hence, when deciding on the degree of CBI, incumbent politicians face a trade-off:
current influence on monetary policy versus policy durability. This paper shows how various
factors change this trade-off and hence the institutional choice. The model predicts that the
level of CBI incumbent politicians choose will increase in politicians’ ability to screen central
bankers’ preferences, in the degree of political polarization, and in the weight politicians place
on future policy outcomes. In contrast, the likelihood for the implementation of an
independent central bank decreases in the re-election prospects of incumbents and in the
utility central bankers receive from holding office.
If your browser can't open the file, please download the file first and then open it
FU DepartmentDepartment Business and Economics
Year of publication2008
Type of documentBook
Terms of use/Rights Nutzungsbedingungen
Created at2009-08-05 : 10:30:59
Last changed2016-01-05 : 02:38:14
Static URLhttp://edocs.fu-berlin.de/docs/receive/FUDOCS_document_000000002840