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| Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights Bester, Helmut Universität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft |
| Main title | Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights |
| Author | Bester, Helmut |
| Institution | Universität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft |
| No. of Pages | 29 S. |
| Series | Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft ; 2005/21 : Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe |
| Keywords | authority, decision rights, externalities, incomplete contracts, imperfect information, theory of the firm |
| Classification (DDC) | 330 Economics |
| Also published in | |
| Abstract | This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that impose externalities on other members of the organization. When only decision rights can be contractually assigned to one of the organization's stakeholders, the optimal assignment minimizes the resulting ineffciencies by giving control rights to the party with the highest stake in the organization's decisions. Under asymmetric information, the effcient allocation of authority depends on the communication of private information. In the case of multiple decision areas, divided control rights may enhance organizational effciency unless there exist complementarities between different decisions. |
| Documents |
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| FU Department | Department Business and Economics |
| Year of publication | 2005 |
| Type of document | Book |
| Language | English |
| Terms of use/Rights | Nutzungsbedingungen |
| Created at | 2008-06-24 : 09:02:51 |
| Last changed | 2014-01-23 : 04:20:05 |
| Static URL | http://edocs.fu-berlin.de/docs/receive/FUDOCS_document_000000000398 |
| ISBN | 3-938369-20-5 |
| Statistics | |
