Silent interests and all-pay auctions
Konrad, Kai A. ;  ;  Universität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Main titleSilent interests and all-pay auctions
AuthorKonrad, Kai A.
EditorUniversität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
No. of Pages25 S.
Series ; 2005,8 : Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe
Keywordsall-pay auctions, externalities, contests, silent minority, shareholdings, ownership structure
Classification (DDC)330 Economics
Also published in
AbstractIf firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information,
silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the allpay
auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in
the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain
from bidding. As a consequence, equilibrium profits of both firms
may increase, but the prize may be allocated less efficiently. The
reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase the profits of the
firms involved in the ownership relationship but without these negative
efficiency effects.
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FU DepartmentDepartment Business and Economics
Year of publication2005
Type of documentBook
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Created at2008-06-20 : 08:09:13
Last changed2016-01-05 : 02:38:05
Static URLhttp://edocs.fu-berlin.de/docs/receive/FUDOCS_document_000000000352