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| The employment effects of labor and product markets deregulation and their implications for structural reform Berger, Helge |
| Haupttitel | The employment effects of labor and product markets deregulation and their implications for structural reform |
| Autor | Berger, Helge; Danninger, Stephan |
| Seitenzahl | 32 S. |
| Schriftenreihe | Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft ; 2006/10 : Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe |
| URL des Originaldokuments | URL >> |
| Fachbereich/Einrichtung | FB Wirtschaftswissenschaft |
| Erscheinungsjahr | 2006 |
| Dokumente | PDF-Datei
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| Freie Schlagwörter | product market regulation, labor market regulation, employment growth, policy coordination, sequencing |
| DDC | 330 Wirtschaft |
| Dokumententyp/-Sammlungen | Monographie/Text |
| Medientyp/Format | Text |
| Abstract | This study explores the effects of market deregulation on employment growth. Empirical analysis of an OECD country panel (1990-2004) suggests that lower levels of product and labor market regulation foster employment growth, including through sizable interaction effects. A theoretical framework is developed for evaluating deregulation strategies in the presence of reform costs. Optimal deregulation takes various forms depending on the deregulation costs and the strength of reform interactions. Compared to the first best, decentralized decision-making can lead to excessive or insufficient deregulation. Securing the first best requires coordinating deregulation activities across sectors and overcoming the partial perspective of decision makers. |
| Sprache | Englisch |
| Rechte | Nutzungsbedingungen |
| Identifier | 3-938369-35-3 (ISBN) |
| Zugriffstatistik | |
| Statische URL | http://edocs.fu-berlin.de/docs/receive/FUDOCS_document_000000000267 |
| Erstellt am | 16.06.2008 - 10:53:50 |
| Letzte Änderung | 19.03.2013 - 11:55:12 |
