Fiscal indulgence in central Europe
Berger, Helge ;  Kopits, George ;  Székely, István P. ;  ;  Universität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Main titleFiscal indulgence in central Europe
Subtitleloss of the external anchor?
AuthorBerger, Helge
AuthorKopits, George
AuthorSzékely, István P.
EditorUniversität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
No. of Pages23 S.
Series ; 2006,9 : Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe
Keywordsfiscal policy, EU economic and monetary union, game-theoretic approach
Classification (DDC)330 Economics
Also published in
AbstractIn recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries on the path to EU accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game-theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes—allowing for regime shifts—depending on country characteristics and EU policies.
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FU DepartmentDepartment Business and Economics
Year of publication2006
Type of documentBook
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Created at2008-06-16 : 08:26:09
Last changed2016-01-05 : 02:38:08
Static URLhttp://edocs.fu-berlin.de/docs/receive/FUDOCS_document_000000000263