Central Bank boards around the world
Berger, Helge ;  Nitsch, Volker ;  Lybek, Tonny ;  Universität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Main titleCentral Bank boards around the world
Subtitlewhy does membership size differ?
AuthorBerger, Helge
AuthorNitsch, Volker
AuthorLybek, Tonny
InstitutionUniversität <Berlin, Freie Universität> / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
No. of Pages46 S.
Series Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft ; 2008/5 : Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe
Keywordscommittee; council; governance; decision making; monetary policy
Classification (DDC)332 Financial economics
Also published in
AbstractThis paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary policy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board’s size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.
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FU DepartmentDepartment Business and Economics
Year of publication2008
Type of documentBook
Terms of use/Rights Nutzungsbedingungen
Created at2008-06-02 : 09:05:08
Last changed2014-01-23 : 04:20:00
Static URLhttp://edocs.fu-berlin.de/docs/receive/FUDOCS_document_000000000104